Myanmar junta’s Rohingya Return Initiative is nothing more than a strategic pretense
This article was first published on Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS)
Key takeaways:
-
The repatriation program lacks fundamental guarantees for Rohingya safety, citizenship, and property rights.
-
The initiative coincides with the junta’s need for international legitimacy amid ongoing sanctions.
-
Similar previous programs in 2018 and 2019 failed to produce meaningful results, and the current conditions in Rakhine State remain hostile to Rohingya return.
A crisis unresolved
In early 2025, Myanmar’s military junta announced a new Rohingya Repatriation Program, claiming it would facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh following the 2017 genocide. The program involves Myanmar verifying refugees as “eligible” for return, with the junta confirming 180,000 Rohingya, out of a list of 800,000 submitted by Bangladesh, as qualified for repatriation.
The initiative unfolds against the backdrop of one of the world’s most severe refugee crises. Since 2017, approximately 750,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh, joining hundreds of thousands already there from previous waves of violence. Bangladesh now hosts the vast majority of Rohingya refugees, with around one million remaining in overcrowded camps in Cox’s Bazar. The prolonged crisis has generated increasing domestic pressure, creating leverage for Myanmar’s junta, which appears to be exploiting Bangladesh’s desperation for a solution, yet without offering meaningful concessions.
Reality on the ground
The junta’s announcement carefully frames the repatriation as voluntary and dignified. However, close examination reveals critical omissions that undermine its credibility. The program provides no pathway to citizenship for the stateless Rohingya under Myanmar’s discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law. It offers no guarantees of safety in areas still controlled by military forces responsible for documented atrocities. Most tellingly, it includes no provisions for accountability or the return of confiscated lands.
Research by human rights organizations presents a starkly different picture from the junta’s promises. The approximately 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Myanmar continue to face severe restrictions on movement, education, healthcare, and religious practice. Military checkpoints limit travel between villages, and permission is required for basic activities such as marriage or pursuing higher education. According to European-funded human rights monitors, conditions in Rakhine State remain fundamentally unchanged. EU diplomatic assessments report continued restrictions and a persistent military presence that renders any safe return impossible. Many former Rohingya villages remain uninhabitable, having been bulldozed or repurposed following the 2017 violence. Meanwhile, the conflict between the military and the Arakan Army has intensified in parts of Rakhine State, creating new security risks that the repatriation program conspicuously fails to address.
Without guarantees of citizenship and safety, repatriation offers little more than a shift from one form of confinement to another, and potentially an even more dangerous one. Unsurprisingly, many Rohingya remain deeply skeptical about returning. Indeed, the current initiative follows a pattern of unfulfilled promises. Similar repatriation agreements were announced in 2018 and 2019, neither of which resulted in significant returns due to the same lack of security guarantees and citizenship rights. This continuity suggests the junta remains more interested in the appearance of progress than in creating conditions for a genuine return.
The junta’s handling of the Rohingya crisis also has broader implications for regional security and stability. The persistence of a large, stateless population vulnerable to radicalization and exploitation presents ongoing risks. Recent reports point to increased activity by transnational criminal networks in the refugee camps, including human trafficking and drug smuggling operations. European security analysts warn that the ongoing crisis undermines EU efforts to strengthen partnerships in Southeast Asia, as the Rohingya issue continues to strain EU–ASEAN relations.
Regional security cooperation has been hampered by disagreements over how to address the crisis. ASEAN’s principle of non-interference has limited its ability to address the root causes of the refugee situation, while creating tensions with international partners who are pushing for more assertive action.
International response
The junta’s initiative comes at a time of particular vulnerability for the regime. Since the February 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military has faced unprecedented international isolation and mounting domestic resistance. Economic sanctions have significantly weakened the country’s economy, resulting in overall contraction and a decline in foreign investment. The timing suggests that the repatriation program is primarily a diplomatic tool, intended to fracture international opposition and project an illusion of reform. The global response has been fragmented. While Western democracies have generally expressed skepticism, several regional powers have either cautiously endorsed the initiative or remained silent.
The EU, which has imposed comprehensive sanctions on Myanmar’s military leadership and strengthened its arms embargo since the coup, has voiced deep skepticism about the repatriation scheme. EU diplomatic missions have emphasized that any returns must be genuinely voluntary and include guarantees of fundamental rights. Brussels maintains that repatriation without citizenship and accountability mechanisms would be premature, a stance that has caused friction with some ASEAN partners who view the initiative more favorably.
In contrast, several regional powers with economic stakes in Myanmar have cautiously welcomed the program as a sign of progress. This differential response plays directly into the junta’s strategy of weakening unified international pressure, one of the few real constraints on its behavior. The initiative appears to serve as a diplomatic fig leaf, providing economic partners with justification to maintain or even expand their business ties, despite ongoing human rights violations.
Conclusion: beyond the façade
A genuinely credible repatriation program would require fundamentally different conditions: amendment of the 1982 Citizenship Law, accountability mechanisms for past atrocities, international monitoring with unrestricted access, the return of confiscated lands, and the repeal of discriminatory policies. None of these elements is present in the current initiative.
For policymakers, the implications are clear. Supporting this initiative without demanding substantive reforms risks complicity in perpetuating Rohingya statelessness and vulnerability. Instead, targeted pressure on Myanmar’s military regime should continue, coupled with sustained humanitarian support for refugees and internally displaced persons. The EU’s ongoing sanctions and diplomatic pressure—alongside its support for international justice mechanisms, including the ICJ genocide case—remain crucial to maintaining accountability.
The junta’s repatriation program ultimately reveals more about its quest for legitimacy than any sincere commitment to resolving the Rohingya crisis. Until the fundamental conditions for dignified return are met, the international community should recognize the initiative for what it is: a strategic pretence designed to ease diplomatic pressure while preserving the structures of persecution that led to genocide.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of CEIAS. This work was supported by the OP JAC Project “MSCA Fellowships at Palacký University III.” CZ.02.01.01/00/22_010/0008685, run at Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic.