After the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, a century-long connection between Russia and Myanmar began to bloom. Given the context of the situation in Myanmar, this Russian involvement may resemble the situation in Syria after 2014, raising concerns about resolving the conflict in Myanmar. In my essay, I will argue that the Russian interest in Myanmar doesn´t pose a significant threat to regional stability and it should not worsen the situation in Myanmar like it did in Syria, mainly because of the events triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
A short history of Russo-Burmese relations
The relationship between today's Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Russia traces back to the early 20th century, a period marked by revolutionary upheaval. The spread of communist ideology found resonance among some Burmese nationalists and intellectuals, who saw the Soviet model as a potential blueprint for their struggle against colonial domination.
Having gained independence in 1948, Burma initially adopted a neutral stance in the Cold War, aligning neither with the Western bloc nor the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, Myanmar's relationship with the Soviet Union began to be characterized by cautious yet pragmatic cooperation. The 1962 military coup in Burma, led by General Ne Win, ushered in an era of retreating from active engagement with the international community, including the Soviet Union, and Burma's self-imposed isolation limited the scope of bilateral cooperation.
In 1988, the Burmese junta’s violent suppression of peaceful protesters calling for democratic reforms led to the imposition of international sanctions against the regime. Neither the declining Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev nor the newly formed Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin were willing to defy international opinion to support Burma, which attempted to improve its global image by officially changing its name to Myanmar in 1989.
However, neighboring China was ready to step in and fill the gap left by Moscow’s political changes. Starting in the early 1990s, large shipments of tanks and howitzers began arriving in Myanmar. This military support, however, came with significant strings attached – Myanmar’s ruling generals had to grant concessions to Chinese companies, align their foreign policy with Beijing, and eliminate the Dalai Lama from Myanmar’s information landscape.
However, Myanmar's generals were dissatisfied with the subpar quality of Chinese tanks and armored vehicles. Beginning in the 2000s, the junta's attempts to reduce its reliance on China significantly benefited Russia. Myanmar acquired Russian military hardware and the junta invested in training thousands of its officers at Russian military academies, while Russian defense companies received orders to produce ammunition and spare parts for Myanmar. Between 2001 and 2021, Myanmar officially paid Moscow $1.7 billion for military contracts.
Is the blooming partnership between the two countries a threat to the region?
After the coup in 2021, Russian military assistance to Myanmar increased rapidly and their alliance seemed to be tighter than ever, but everything changed with Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Soon after, Vladimir Putin understood that the war against Ukraine would not end quickly or easily. Russia ended up isolated from the Western world and began searching for partners, with whom it could make alliances. Myanmar was one of the countries included in this new foreign policy shift.
The first signal emerged in September 2022 during the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, where for the first time, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing met Vladimir Putin. It's quite possible that Putin may have warned Min Aung Hlaing then and there that Russia may cut back on its military cooperation with Myanmar and agitate for the return of some of the Russian military hardware that had been sold to the junta over the years. After all, the existence of such an initiative came to light very soon thereafter. Faced with mounting battlefield losses and an inability to evade international sanctions sufficiently to modernize many of the tanks and armored vehicles it still had in storage, Russia began buying back some of the material it had previously exported to Asian countries. Given the current situation on the battlefield in Myanmar, the junta isn't doing well and it would surely be welcome, if they could keep the ammunition for themselves, instead of sending it to Ukraine.
With Russia buying back military equipment, the situation in Myanmar is unlikely to worsen to the extent of Syria. While the supply of weapons introduces a destabilizing element, Russia is in dire need of ammunition and military hardware, sourcing from countries such as North Korea, Iran, and now Myanmar. Consequently, Russia may significantly reduce its military support to the junta, which, given poor timing, could create complications for the military junta, particularly if Myanmar’s civil war does not develop according to the junta's plans in the near future.
Unlike the long-standing Russian-Syrian partnership with its roots in the Cold War, the relationship between Russia and Myanmar is notably different. Compared to the importance of Bashar al-Assad for Putin, Myanmar's junta leader Min Aung Hlaing was never received in Russia on the highest level, at least not until Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Between 2013 and 2020, Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia four times, but never met Putin in person. This relationship therefore arose out of time-bound necessity and was not formed by long-term strategic imperatives.
To conclude this analysis, consider one final point: during Putin’s visit to Asia, where he met with the leaders of North Korea and Vietnam, why did he not arrange a meeting with Myanmar representatives? This omission suggests that the relationship between Russia and Myanmar is not as significant and thus cannot further destabilize the situation within Myanmar, unlike the case in Syria.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while Russia's recent engagement with Myanmar has intensified following geopolitical shifts, particularly amid the Ukraine conflict, it differs significantly from the long-term, deeply entrenched partnership seen in Syria. Myanmar's junta leader has not historically held the same strategic importance for Putin as the Syrian leader did. The recent repurchase of military equipment by Russia due to its own pressing needs suggests a potential reduction in military support to Myanmar, thereby mitigating concerns about escalating regional instability. The transactional nature of the current Russo-Myanmar relationship, driven by immediate geopolitical imperatives rather than long-term strategic alignment, indicates that it is unlikely to exacerbate Myanmar's internal conflict to the extent seen in Syria.
Antonín Nenutil is currently pursuing a Master's degree at the Palacky University Olomouc. He participated in the EUVIP summer school ‘Navigating geostrategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: Focus on Southeast Asian and Myanmar’ at the Palacky University Olomouc in June 2024, and this blog post was created as part of an assignment for the summer school.